Utah v. Kent Kyle Stringham : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2002
Utah v. Kent Kyle Stringham : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Julie George; Attorney for Appellant.
Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; David K.
Cunningham; Deputy Duchesne County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Utah v. Kent KyleStringham, No. 20020591 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2002).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3893
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KENT KYLE STRINGHAM 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020591-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JULIE GEORGE 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DAVID K. CUNNINGHAM 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
v. 
KENT KYLE STRINGHAM 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020591-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
JULIE GEORGE 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
DAVID K. CUNNINGHAM 
Deputy Duchesne County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .; 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS DEFENDANT'S APPEAL AS 
PREMATURE BECAUSE THE MINUTE ENTRY DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS 
UNSIGNED AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO FINAL APPEALABLE 
ORDER 
CONCLUSION..... .... 
ADDENDUM - State v. Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (Memorandum Decision) 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982) 3 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) 2 
State v. Gardner,200l UT41,P.3d 1043 7 
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 2, 3,4 
State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997) 6 
State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528 3, 4, 5 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 4 
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,40 P.3d 630 3,4 
State v. Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished) 2, 4, 5 
Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah App. 1988) 3,4 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(1999) 3, 5 
Utah R. App. P. 3 2, 4 
Utah R. App. P. 4 2, 4, 5, 6 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KENT KYLE STRINGHAM, 
Defendant/Apellant. 
Case No. 20020591-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Should the Court amend its opinion to hold that defendant's appeal from the trial 
court's unsigned denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not late, but rather, 
premature? 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The State does not dispute that the Court correctly dismissed defendant's appeal 
for lack of jurisdiction-—the State disagrees only with how the Court reached that result. 
For reasons set forth below, the Court lacks jurisdiction here, not because defendant 
failed to timely file a notice appeal from the date of sentencing, but rather because 
defendant prematurely appealed from the trial court's unsigned denial of his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. The Court should therefore dismiss the appeal without 
prejudice and allow the trial court to enter a signed, final appealable order. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS DEFENDANT'S APPEAL AS 
PREMATURE BECAUSE THE MINUTE ENTRY DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA WAS 
UNSIGNED AND CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO FINAL 
APPEALABLE ORDER 
The Court dismissed defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that 
"[defendant] was required to file the notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the 
Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment, to be timely," and defendant did not do so. State 
v. Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished) (a copy is attached). However, the 
Court's analysis overlooks that a defendant who pleads guilty cannot directly appeal 
from a judgment and commitment order. See State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1311-
1312 (Utah 1987). As a result of this oversight, the Court mistakenly runs the time for 
appeal in this guilty plea case from the order entering judgment rather than from the 
denial of the motion to withdraw the plea. Hence, the Court's discussion regarding the 
tardiness of the instant appeal is erroneous and should be corrected. 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that direct appeals be 
taken from "final orders and judgments." "A judgment is final when it ends the 
controversy between the parties litigant." Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538, 
539 (Utah 1979). In a criminal proceeding, the Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment 
Order is usually the final order that disposes of the case and starts running the thirty-day 
window to file an appeal from the conviction. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("[T]he notice 
appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days 
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after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from"). However, post-judgment 
motions can also result in final appealable orders. See Cahoon v. Cahoon 641 P.2d 140, 
142 (Utah 1982). Moreover, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on appeal must 
first file a motion to withdraw the plea. See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312 
(remanding to allow defendant to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea in a case where 
no motion had previously been filed but where notice of appeal was timely in order to 
avoid possibility that defendant could prosecute two appeals in the same case); State v. 
Reyes, 2002 UT 13, f 3,40 P.3d 630 (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction because 
defendant did not timely move to withdraw his guilty plea); Summers v. Cook, 759 P.2d 
341, 342, 344-345 (Utah App. 1988) ("In Gibbons, the Supreme Court determined that 
a defendant could not simply appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea. Id. at 1311-
1312. Rather, defendant must first file a motion to withdraw plea, giving the court 
who took the plea the first chance to consider defendant's arguments. If the motion is 
denied, defendant could then appeal—not from the conviction per se, but from the 
denial of the motion"). 
He may file this motion until 30 days after sentencing. State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 
68, ^  11-13, 31 P.3d 528 (holding "that the thirty-day limit for filing a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea found in [UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1999)], begins to run 
at the time the district court enters final judgment"). In this case, it is the trial court's 
post-judgment order denying the motion that finally disposes of the case and which is a 
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final appealable order under Utah R. App. P. 3(a). Ibid. Consequently, a notice of appeal 
filed within 30 days of this deniaMs timely. 
Based on the above, it is of no consequence here that defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea did not toll the time to appeal from the judgment under the pre-
November 2002 rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as found by this Court. 
See Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished). Precisely because defendant pled 
guilty to the charges against him, he was precluded from directly appealing the 
judgment and commitment order.1 See Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1311-1312; Reyes, 2002 
UT 13, f 3; Summers, 759 P.2d at 342, 344-345. Defendant's appeal is thus from the 
post-judgment order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. It follows that 
the time for filing an appeal from the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea runs ( 
from the date of the denial, not from the entry of judgment, as erroneously found by this 
Court. See Stringham, 2003 UT App 105 (unpublished). 
Indeed, to hold as Stringham does effectively precludes defendants, who, like 
Stringham, file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the entry of judgment, see 
i 
Ostler, 2001 UT 68, ^  11-13, but who do not obtain a ruling thereon within thirty-days 
after the entry of judgment.2 Under the current decision, because the trial court did not 
— i 
1
 While defendant would not be precluded from directly appealing a sentence 
entered pursuant to a guilty plea, see State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Utah 
1989), defendant raises no issues regarding his sentence here. 
i 
2Notably, there is no pre-November 2002 rule or statute requiring trial courts to act 
on post-judgment motions to withdraw a guilty plea within the thirty-days following 
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deny defendant's timely post-judgment motion to withdraw until the fifty-fourth day after 
sentencing, defendant lost his right to challenge that denial. See Stringham, 2003 UT 
App 105 (unpublished). In extending the time to appeal the denial of a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea from thirty-days after entry of the plea to thirty-days after 
sentencing, the supreme court in Ostler surely contemplated that defendants so doing 
would thereafter be able to appeal within thirty days of any subsequent denial of the 
motion, regardless of whether the denial occurs on the twenty-ninth, thirty-first, or, as 
here, the fifty-fourth day following sentencing. Id. at ff 11-13. Nothing in Ostler 
suggests that the supreme court meant to alter the traditional rule that an appeal from the 
denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea must be filed within thirty-days of the denial. 
See, e,g, Utah R. App. P. 4(a) ("the notice of appeal.. . shall be filed with the clerk of the 
trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from"). 
As to the effect of the 2002 amendment to rule 4(a), noted in Stringham, 2003 UT 
App 105, n.2, the 2002 amendment was clearly adopted in response to Ostler's extension 
of the time to withdraw a guilty plea. See Ostler, 2001 UT 68, fflf 11-13. In extending the 
time to appeal the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea from thirty days after entry 
of the plea to thirty days after sentencing, Ostler virtually insured that motions to 
withdraw guilty pleas would not be decided prior to sentencing and thereby significantly 
imposition of sentence or entry of judgment. However, section 77-13-6(2)(b) was 
recently amended to provide that a motion to withdraw must be filed before 
announcement of sentence and that the sentence "may not be announced unless the 
motion [to withdraw] is denied." See H.B. 238, Gen. Sess. (Ut. 2003). 
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increased the possibility that criminal defendants would file two separate appeals in the 
same case. For example, a defendant who timely moved to withdraw his guilty plea 
within 30 days after sentencing, likely would not receive a ruling on that motion until 
after the time for appealing his sentence had run. Thus, if the defendant is dissatisfied 
with his sentence, he must file a notice of appeal before the trial court rules on his motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea. If the trial court then denies his motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea, the defendant must file a second notice of appeal from the denial, thereby creating 
two appeals in the same case, although he could later move the appellate court to 
consolidate the two appeals. Under the 2002 amendment to rule 4(a), filing a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea tolls the time for filing the notice of appeal until the "entry of the 
order . . . denying the motion to withdraw the plea," and thereby precludes the above 
scenario of two appeals in the same case. Thus, the amendment is not reasonably read to 
suggest that a notice of appeal from the denial of a post-judgment motion to withdraw 
filed on the thirty-first, or even the fifty-fourth day after sentencing is late, regardless of 
whether the motion has been acted upon in that timeframe. 
Rather, for the reasons originally set out in the State's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
for Lack of Jurisdiction, defendant's notice of appeal, filed outside the thirty-days 
following sentencing, but prior to the entry of a final order, was premature, not late. 
Specifically, the trial court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea in an 
unsigned minute entry (R78-79), which is not a final appealable order for purposes of 
appeal. See State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1997). And, absent an entry of a 
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final order, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal. Id. Therefore, because 
defendant's notice of appeal from the unsigned order was premature rather than late, this 
case should be dismissed without prejudice to allow the trial court to enter a signed, final 
appealable order. State v. Gardner, 2001 UT 41, \ 10, P.3d 1043 (recognizing that 
defendant had not lost his right to appeal "[i]nsomuch as no order has yet been prepared," 
and directing that defendant "may file a new appeal after the trial court signs and enters 
the formal order"). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court mistakenly ran the time for appeal in this guilty plea case from the 
judgment and commitment order and on that erroneous ground determined the notice was 
late. The State therefore asks the Court to amend its opinion to reflect that defendant's 
appeal from the unsigned denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty is premature, not 
late, and to dismiss the appeal without prejudice to allow the trial court to enter a signed 
and final appealable order. 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 9A April 2003. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that oiy?T April 2003, two copies of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR REHEARING were mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
JULIE GEORGE 
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— ' • — 0 0 O 0 0 — : — 
State of Utah, 
Pla.intiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Kyle Kent Stringham, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020591-CA 
F I L E D 
(April 10, 2003) 
|2003 UT App 105[ 
Eighth District, Duchesne Department 
The Honorable A. Lynn Payne 
Attorneys: Julie George, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Bench. 
PER CURIAM: 
This case is before the court on Appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction because of an untimely notice of appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 
10(a). The Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in this case was entered on 
May 22, 2002. A motion to withdraw the guilty plea was filed on June 6, 
2002, and an unsigned minute entry denying that motion was entered July 
15, 2002. (1) A notice of appeal was filed on July 16, 2002. 
Appellee contends that the notice of appeal was premature because 
Page 2 of 2 
Appellant appeals from an unsigned minute entry denying his motion to 
withdraw his plea. However, the notice of appeal was not premature; it was 
filed late. Appellant may not appeal a plea of guilty unless he moves to 
withdraw the plea in the trial court. See State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,510,- '• 
40 P.3d 630. However, the rule in effect at all times relevant to this 
appeal did not include a motion to withdraw a plea among those post-trial 
motions that toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. :; See Utah R. 
App P. 4(b) (enumerating those post-trial motions that toll the time for 
filing of the notice of appeal). For this reason, Appellant was required 
to file the notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of the Judgement, 
Sentence, and Commitment, to be timely. He did not do so. 
Because the notice of appeal was untimely, we lack jurisdiction over the 
appeal. See Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamareaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains 
only the authority to dismiss the action."). 
We dismiss the appeal as untimely. 
Norman H. Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
• • • ' < 
Judith M. B i l l ings , 
\ ssoc ia te Presiding Judge 
< 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
.. The trial court minute entry erroneously characterizes the motion as 
m e for a new trial, but no motion for a new trial was filed. Clearly, 
:his was a clerical error and the docket should show Appellant's motion as 
i motion to withdraw his plea. 
!. Utah R. App. P. 4(b) was amended in November of 2002 to include a 
lotion to withdraw a plea among those post-trial motions that toll the 
:ime for filing the notice of appeal. However, our analysis is based upon 
:he rule in effect at-the time of this case. 
I 
